Moldova’s Democratic Defiance

• Opinion by Andrew Firmin (london)
• Thursday, October 09, 2025
• Inter Press Service

LONDON, October 9 (IPS) – Democracy was the winner and Russia the loser in Moldova’s 28 September election. The incumbent pro-Europe Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority on just over half of the vote, while support for a pro-Russia coalition collapsed to a record low. The result came in the face of Russia’s most intense attempt yet to influence an election, with a propaganda and disinformation operation allegedly orchestrated by Ilan Shor, a disgraced Moldovan oligarch who fled to Russia to escape jail time for his role in a massive fraud.

Moldova, a landlocked country with a population of under 2.4 million, rarely commands headlines. But its location, sandwiched between EU member Romania and war-torn Ukraine, makes it prime territory for an ongoing tussle over the future of former communist states.

Since 2009, every Moldovan prime minister has been committed to European integration, and Moldova formally applied to join the EU following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As support for pro-Russia parties has declined at the ballot box, Russia has increasingly turned to covert influence operations, with Shor the reported lynchpin.

Shor is believed to have been a key figure in Moldova’s biggest scandal: in November 2014, around US$1 billion was fraudulently transferred from three banks in fake loans. The banks went bankrupt, forcing the government to provide a bailout equivalent to one eighth of GDP.

Shor, chair of one of the banks, was accused of being among the masterminds. In 2017, he was convicted of money laundering, fraud and breach of trust and sentenced to seven and a half years in jail. But in 2019, while under house arrest pending appeal, he fled the country, first to Israel and then Russia, where he now has citizenship. Shor’s only hope of returning without going to jail is a pro-Russia government, and he’s able to use his riches to promote his cause.

Shor was accused^[1] of paying people to take part in protests triggered by high energy prices when Russia used gas supplies as a weapon, slashing them in the winter of 2022-2023. Ahead of the 2024 presidential election and a referendum on the EU, he promised to pay people^[2] to register for his campaign to oppose the referendum or publish anti-EU posts; the government said he’d paid close to US$16 million to 130,000 people, sharing instructions on how spread disinformation on the messaging app Telegram. The 2024 campaign was awash with disinformation^[3], including deepfake videos and false claims about President Maia Sandu. Fake social media accounts proliferated, opposing the EU and Sandu and promoting pro-Russia views.

The 2025 campaign saw a further intensification of these influence efforts. A secret network, again coordinated via Telegram, offered^[4] to pay people for posting pro-Russia propaganda and anti-PAS disinformation on Facebook and TikTok, and to help carry out selective polling that would overstate pro-Russia support, potentially as part of a plan to dispute the results should they be close. A BBC investigation found links between this network, Shor and one of his organisations, Evrazia, with money sent via a Russian state-owned bank used by its defence ministry.

The network ran online training sessions on how to use ChatGPT to produce social media posts, including those making ludicrous claims that Sandu is involved in child trafficking and the EU would force people to change sexual orientation. At least 90 TikTok accounts receiving over 23 million views since the start of the year were involved. The investigation found no comparable disinformation campaign in support of PAS.

Russia also evidently tried to target^[5] Moldova’s million-strong diaspora, who tend to favour pro-EU parties. People in diaspora communities were offered cash, evidently from Russian sources, to serve as election observers, with large bonuses for providing any evidence of fraud. This seemed to be an attempt to promote doubt about the integrity of the diaspora vote.

The influence campaign extended to the Orthodox Church: last year, Moldovan clergy were treated to an all-expenses-paid trip to holy sites in Russia, then promised money^[6] if they took to social media to warn their followers about the dangers of EU integration. They duly established over 90 Telegram channels pushing out almost identical content positioning the EU as a threat to traditional family values.

A few days before the vote, Moldovan authorities detained^[7] 74 people suspected of planning post-election violence. Authorities claimed they’d travelled to Serbia, under the guise of an Orthodox pilgrimage, to be trained in how to resist security forces, break through cordons and use weapons. On election day, officials reported attempted cyberattacks and bomb scares at polling stations in Moldova and abroad.

Challenges ahead

Moldova’s democratic institutions have survived a crucial test, repaying efforts to strengthen the country’s defences against Russian interference made since the 2024 votes. But the struggle for Moldova’s future is far from over. As it moves closer to the EU, Russia isn’t simply going to walk away. Even dirtier tricks may come.

Meanwhile the government faces many other problems. In one of Europe’s poorest countries, people are struggling with the high cost of living. Public services have come under strain as Moldova hosts proportionately more Ukrainian refugees than anywhere else. Corruption concerns haven’t been adequately addressed. Many young people are seeking better lives abroad.

In combating future Russian influence attempts, the government faces the challenge of striking the right balance on regulating social media and political financing, strengthening its intelligence services and building stronger social media literacy and awareness of disinformation. It will need help from EU countries, as it will to further modernise its energy infrastructure, including through more investments in renewable energy to disarm one of Russia’s most potent tools.

Moldova’s hopes of EU membership will rest on its progress in addressing these challenges. Even then, as the experience of Hungary^[8] shows, becoming an EU member doesn’t guarantee protection against the dangers of authoritarianism. But there’s no hope for democracy and human rights should Moldova fall under Russia’s grip.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens^[9] and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report^[10].

For interviews or more information, please contact [email protected]^[11]

© Inter Press Service (20251009080451) — All Rights Reserved. Original source: Inter Press Service^[12]